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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 





BRADLEY D. GREEN, 
DefendantIAppellant. 
Brian E. Elkins, P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal fiom the District Court of the 
~ i f th~udic ia l  District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Blaine 
HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE 
District Judge 
State Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals 
P. 0 .  Box 83720 
Boise. ID 83720-0010 
Attorney for DefendantIAppellant Attorney for PlaintiffiRespondent 
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APPELLANT'S REPLY 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(c), Green files his Reply Brief limited to additional argument and 
rebuttal to the contentions of the State made in its Respondent's Brief. 
RESPONSE TO STATE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State argues that Green "refused to perform the tests and demanded that his attorney 
be present." (Respondent's Brief, p. 1; citing Tr., p. 17, L. 25 - p. 20, L. 14.) 
Officer Davis testified at the evidentiary hearing that: 
At that point there he wondered why he had to do it, I know that much, and 
then -would it be okay if I looked at my report? I can't quite recall. 
*** 
Mr. Green had stated he was not interested in doing field sobriety tests and 
wanted counsel present. 
(Tr., p. 18, Ls. 1-8.) However, the actual audio recording of the incident, Defendant's Exhibit 
A, is a little different in that Green told Officer Davis that he would be happy to perform the tests 
once he was able to communicate with counsel (See, Defendant's Exhibit A, 2:40). 
The State also argues that the booking process "was delayed by Green's lack of 
cooperation" (Respondent's Brief, p. 2; citing Tr., p. 29, L.19 - p.30, L. 6) but there is nothing in 
the record to show the length of the delay and, if anything, it was insignificant as once Green was 
threatened with being thrown in the "drunk tank" he quickly remembered his address and Social 
Security Number. (Tr., p. 30, Ls. 1-6.) 
The State mentions there is no record of Green's blood alcohol content: it was in excess 
of the legal limit since he agreed to conditionally plead to DUI. Green's BAC was .14. 
RESPONSE TO THE STATE'S "ARGUMENT" 
The State suggests that Green is arguing that his rights were violated during the field tests 
when he was denied the opportunity to consult with counsel "to arrange alternative testing during 
the officer's attempted administration of the field sobriety tests . . . ." See, Respondent's Brief, p. 
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4. Green is not suggesting that he was entitled to make arrangements for a blood test during the 
field sobriety tests nor is Green asking this Court to decide whether he was entitled to speak to a 
lawyer during the field sobriety tests. Green's position is that he should have been allowed to 
make a phone call, at a minimum, when his blood was drawn, not an hour and 10 minutes later 
when he was released on bail; and more importantly it is Green's position that he should have 
been allowed to make a phone call after he "refused" to submit to a breath test at 2:03 a.m. at the 
Blaine County Sheriffs Department. 
Under the totality of the circumstances when examining whether Green's due process 
rights were compromised, Green believes it is important to point out the incorrect statements that 
were made by Officer Davis during the field tests and ultimately what he was placed under arrest 
for. As pointed out earlier, Green was placed under arrest, as described by the magistrate, for 
"refusing to submit to evidentiary tests." (R., p. 43.) Officer Davis also told Green that he was 
required to perform field sobriety tests under Idaho's implied consent law and that Green agreed 
to do that when he signed up for his Washington's driver's license. Officer Davis testified that he 
was choosing to use field sobriety tests as the evidentiary tests under Idaho's implied consent 
law. 
Both the magistrate and the district court at least acknowledged that this issue presented a 
"close call" but seemed to err on the side of caution by not thinking that concepts of fundamental 
fairness and due process should allow Green to make a call to his lawyer while Officer Davis 
secured a blood warrant. For example, the magistrate said: "This is a close call because the case 
law makes clear that priority should always be given to a person attempting to preserve or obtain 
exculpatory evidence." (R., p. 47.) The district court said: 
The right to a phone call so that you can gather evidence. That's what 
Madden and Carr seem to talk about. 
But 1 think your point is that right accrues equally to the defendant and the 
State as soon as the officer says, okay, that's a refusal, you're getting the 
penalties for refusal. And I think your point is, okay, now I get my phone 
call, now I can gather evidence, exculpatory evidence, just like the State can 
gather their evidence for a prosecution. The State may be able to hold them 
in custody. The defendant isn't able to bond out but ought to be able to male 
his phone call. 
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And in looking at that side, I can see the defendant's point. The defendant 
could perhaps be able to call a bail bondsman, and attorney, anyone else and 
say, look, they're going to get a warrant, I'm apparently going to the hospital, 
I want my own test, I want - they're going to take me down and draw blood. 
I want to arrange for my own blood test while I'm down there or whatever. 
Really, what we're talking about here is the right to gather evidence and when 
you get it, when it accrues. 
(Tr., p. 47, Ls. 8-25; p. 48, Ls. 1-3.) 
This idea was first recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Woolery, 1 16 Idaho 
368,775 P.2d 1210 (1989) where there exists an "inherent exigency" with the destruction of 
evidence by metabolism of alcohol in the blood system which provided a basis for t l~e court's 
decision in State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181, 184,911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1996). In Carr, the court 
said: "Therefore, the only opportunity for a defendant in a DUI case to gather exculpatory 
evidence is within a reasonable time following his arrest and administration of the State's BAC 
test." The Carr case thereafter, cited with approval, Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash.2d 733,409 
P.2d 867, 871 (1966) noting that a defendant's rights were violated when he was denied an 
opportunity to contact an attorney following the issuance of a citation for DUI which prevented 
the defendant's effective preparation of a defense. See, also, State v. Can&eZl, 139 Idaho 409,80 
P.3d 345 (Ct. App. 2003) (detainee's opportunity to gather exculpatory evidence lasts only a 
short time following arrest). ("In Carr, we held that a several-hour delay in granting a 
defendant's request to speak to her attorney was a deprivation of due process because it 
prevented her from preserving evidence conceming her level of sobriety.") 
However, the magistrate and district court, and now the State, attempt to distinguish 
Green from Madden and Carr by arguing that Green was not entitled to call his lawyer because 
he "refused" to submit to the breath test. On Defendant's Exhibit A Green did not affirmatively 
say that he was refusing to submit to the test and, following his earlier offers of conditional 
compliance with FSTs, Green told Officer Davis that he would be happy to submit to the breath 
test once he was able to tallc to a lawyer (Defendalt's Exhibit A, 13:09). As pointed out in 
Green's Appellant's Brief, the Intoxilyzer 5000 Breath Testing Machine "timed out" at 2:03 and 
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printed a card noting "subject refused to continue" (R., p. 5)' 
But the effort to distinguish Green is of no consequence especially when one considers 
the "inherent exigency" that is occurring as evidence is destroyed or altered. This is where the 
Montana Supreme Court came down when it decided State v. Swanson, 222 Mont. 357,722 P.2d 
1155 (1986) (one accused of DUI has right to obtain independent blood test to establish his 
sobriety, regardless of whether he submits to a test chosen by the police). See, also, Smith v. 
Cada, 562 P.2d 390 (Ariz. App. 1977). 
This is heightened by the present situation where Green was being held in the conference 
room at the Blaine County Sheriffs Department for approximately 52 minutes while the blood 
warrant was obtained that was not even necessary under Woolery. Green literally sat there during 
that time while his BAC was altered and/or destroyed and no delay or disruption could have 
occurred during that time period if Green had been allowed to call a lawyer. 
Another point that seems to be lost by the lower courts, and now the State, is that Green 
was still not allowed to call a lawyer after he submitted to a blood draw at 3:30 a.m. and was not 
released from jail until 4:40 a.m. which would have been the earliest that he could have called a 
lawyer. Another hour and ten minutes went by while Green was prevented from making a call to 
a lawyer. That fact, in and of itself, would seem under Carr to justify suppressing Green's blood 
test results. 
The State, time and again, takes selective portions out of I. C. 3 18-8002(4)(e) by only 
quoting the first sentence out of that subsection, the balance of which reads: 
The failure or inability to obtain an additional test or tests by a person 
shall not preclude the admission of results of evidentiary testing for 
alcohol concentration or for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating 
substances taken at the direction of the peace officer unless the additional 
test was denied by the peace officer. 
'See, also, Intoxilyzer 5000 - Operator's Training Manual (March 2007) issued by the Idaho 
State Police Forensic Services, p. 8, where it reads, in part: "After the message "PLEASE BLOWIR" 
is displayed, the instrument will automatically printout a refusal if a sample is not obtained within 
(3) three minutes." 
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Later in its brief, Respondent's Brief, p. 11, the State cites I. C. 5 18-8002A(2)(f) which 
is misplaced as that statute deals with administrative proceedings and is an incorrect recitation of 
Idaho's implied consent law set forth in I. C. § 18-8002.2 For these reasons, Green does agree 
with the State that I. C. 5 18-8002A(2) is "constitutionally misleading" but that administrative 
statute is not really applicable to Green's situation. 
As in Carr, Green's primary complaint does not pass or fail based upon a strict reading of 
I. C. 18-8002(4)(e), as suggested by the State, but rather it is hinged upon an analysis of due 
process. It is interesting to note, however, that the State did not contest Green's argument that 
the application of Idaho's implied consent law technically concluded when Green was construed 
as having "refused" the breath test. At that point, Officer Davis went about an unnecessary delay 
of seeking a blood warrant which, by the way, Green submitted to. That fine distinction is 
important in analyzing the grand scheme of things presented by Green. It is Green's view that 
the application of Idaho's implied consent law ended when it was construed, or determined, that 
Green had refused to submit to a breath test. 
But, certainly, it can be seen that Carr did not involve the strict application of Idaho's 
implied consent law under I. C. 3 18-8002(4)(e). She did not request to have "additional tests 
made by a person of [her] own choosing" but rather she was simply asking to be able to call her 
lawyer. If we apply the State's argument in Green's case to the Carr holding, then the Carr 
decision would not have come out as it did. Relying on language from cases decided by the 
United States Supreme Court, the Carr court realized, 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the 
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. (Citation 
omitted.) Due process, unlike some legal rules, "is not a technical conception 
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." (Citation 
omitted.) Rather, "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands." (Citation omitted.) 
* * * 
The private interest affected in this case is Carr's interest in procuring 
evidence which would challenge the results of the State's BAC test. By 
2For example, other mistakes in the administrative proceeding set forth in I. C. 3 18-8002A 
fails to advise the driver that if he refuses to submit to a BAC test, he will subject himself to a civil 
penalty of $250. See, Id. at (2)(c). Compare with I. C. 18-8002(3)(a). 
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denying Carr access to a telephone for approximately five hours after her 
arrest for DUI, the State denied her the means by which she could establish 
her defense. As recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court an "inherent 
exigency" exists in a DUI setting, due to the destruction of evidence by 
metabolism of alcohol in the blood. 
128 Idaho at 184. 
We submit the "procedural protections" in Green's "particular situation" demands that he 
be permitted to make a telephone call while evidence was wasting away. 
Green concedes that there is language in Carr that says ". . . When a person is arrested for 
DUI and given an evidentiary BAC test, that person must be allowed, at a minimum, to make a 
phone call upon request to do so." Id. However, Green, unlike the State, does not read that 
language to boldly stand for the proposition that a phone call can only be made once the accused 
submits to the State's BAC test. When one compares that language with the broader notions of 
due process cited above, it seems to be insignificant. Indeed, as can be seen fiom Green's 
situation, such a condition offends notions of fundamental fairness as Green sat in a conference 
room at the Blaine County Sheriffs Department for 50 minutes while waiting for an unnecessary 
blood warrant when there would have been no harm in allowing him to make a phone call. 
If this Court is faced with choosing between the rationale of the case relied upon by the 
State, State v. Larivee, 656 NW.2d 226 (Minn. 2003) or those cases decided similar to State v. 
Swanson, 722 P.2d 1155, then the better reason ml'e, Green submits, is premised upon the 
holding in State v. Swanson 
If one recognizes the fundamental theme from Woolery, an "inherent exigency" and the 
due process right to obtain exculpatory evidence from Carr, then it seems that the natural flow of 
these opinions would point to the State v. Swanson rationale instead of a strict requirement, based 
upon a provision of the implied consent law that the subject first be required to submit to the 
State's test before being allowed to make a phone call. In Swanson, the Montana Supreme Court 
rejected a similar argument that was made by the State in that case relying on Montana's implied 
consent statute. 
A criminal accused has a constitutional right to attempt to obtain exculpatory 
evidence. When the crime involves intoxication, the accused has a right to 
obtain a sobriety test independent of that offered by the arresting officer. The 
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language of 5 61-8-405(2), MCA, does not support the State's interpretation 
that the right to an independent test arises only after the accused taltes a test 
designated by the arresting officer. The Arizona Appellate Court interpreted 
a statute identical to 5 61-8-405(2), MCA, and held that the State's 
interpretation "would result in an unconstitutional restraint on the right of a 
criminal accused to attempt to obtain independent evidence of his innocense 
and operate to deprive the accused of due process of law. Smith v. Cada, 
(1977) 114 Ariz. 510,562 P.2d 390,393. Other cases also hold that denying 
one charged with an offense involving intoxication the right to attempt to 
obtain at his own expense a blood or other tests to establish sobriety amounts 
to a denial of due process. State v. Choate (Tenn. 1983), 667 S. W.2d 11 1; 
McNutt v. Arizona (1982), 133 Ariz. 7, 648 P.2d 122; State v. Snipes (Mo. 
1972) 478 S.W.2d 299; Kesler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 459 P.2d 
900 (parallel cite omitted) (1969); In Re Martin (1962), 374 P.2d 801 
(parallel cite omitted). 
State v. Swanson, 722 P.2d 1155, 1157. 
The symmetry ofSwanson 's reliance of McNutt v. Superior Court ofstate of Arizona 
should not be missed as the Carr court also relied on McNutt 
Lastly, on page 13 of the Respondent's Brief, the State argues that I. C. 5 18-8002(2) does 
not provide "an affirmative statutory right to consult with counsel . . . after refusing to submit to 
the State's evidentiary testing." (Respondent's Brief, p. 13.) Again, it appears that Green needs 
to reiterate this point. He did not "refuse" to submit to the test in practical terms by saying "I 
refuse to submit to your test." Green kept saying that he would be happy to take the test after he 
spoke to his lawyer. But the right of an accused to speak to a lawyb is not conditioned upon 
submitting to the test as we can see from Madden and Carr and Carr 's reliance on Tacoma v. 
Heater, supra (which held denial of right to contact a lawyer following issuance of citation for 
DUI prevented defendant's effective preparation of defense because of the destruction of 
evidence through the metabolism of alcohol). 
Under paragraph D of the Respondent's Brief, pp. 13-14, the State argues that "The 
record is devoid of evidence that the State denied or materially interfered with Green's 
opportunity to contact counsel or make arrangements for additional testing once Green actually 
submitted to the blood draw." As was the testimony in Madden, it remains unchanged through 
the testimony of Officer Davis where the officer testified that it was his understanding that Green 
was not entitled to call a lawyer until he posted bail and was released from jail (Tr., p. 30, Ls. 19- 
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25; p. 31, Ls. 1-3.). In Madden, the opinion refers to the policy of the Blaine County Jail that 
DUI arrestees could not call their lawyer until booking procedures were completed. Finally, the 
State argues on page 14 of its brief that Green has failed to show that any right to arrange 
alternative testing was violated after the blood draw but that argument was already rejected in 
Carr. 
CONCLUSION 
Green respectfully requests that the Court reverse the magistrate's denial of Green's 
Motion to Suppress. Green was arrested at 1:28 a.m. and was released from custody at 4:40 a.m. 
During that entire time, Green was not permitted access to a telephone to call his lawyer. During 
that entire time, his right to due process slipped away with each tick of the clock. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A day of February, 2010. 
$+- z , u  
BRIAN E. ELKINS 
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